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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE SHIFTING BASIS OF JURISDICTION 1
By G. W. C. Ross*
HE foundation of jurisdiction is physical power. '  This
J statement is supposed to sum up with characteristically suc-
cinct accuracy 3 the most orthodox common law tradition. If a state
has a given thing or person actually present. within its physical
power, then its courts have jurisdiction to dispose of that person
or thing; conversely, the state's courts have no jurisdiction over
any person or thing not thus within its physical power.4  Put
most baldly: If John Doe is in Minnesota, any plaintiff can sue
him in Minnesota court on any transitory cause of action and
acquire valid jurisdiction; if Doe is not and does not live in this
state, no plaintiff can sue him here 4nd get personal judgment by
default.5 Either way, it is immaterial where the plaintiff lives, or
is, or where the events occurred, out of which the litigation has
grown, or where the necessary witnesses live, or are, or whether
to decide the case the Minnesota court will apply its own domestic
law or will determine the rights of the parties by the rules of
some foreign law.; If Doe is in Minnesota, it is immaterial
whether he lives here or is only found here, however temporarily.
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas College School of Law, St. Paul,
Minnesota.
'For a definition and discussion of "jurisdiction" see American Law
Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement, sec. 43. But here the word will
be used specially, to mean a state's right to summon a person before its
courts as defendant to respond to litigation, and to enter valid default
judgment against him if he fails to do so.
2 Per Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 91, 37
Sup. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608.
3 Characteristic, i.e., of Mr. Justice Holmes.
4Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 U. S. 714. 24 L. Ed. 565. The same
idea will be found expressed in many cases cited in footnotes following.
Cf. Story, Conflicts, ch. 2.
sJurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem are passed over.
OCf. Dewey v. Des Moines, (1899) 173 U. S. 193, 19 Sup. Ct. 379. 43
L. Ed. 665: State ex rel. Bossung v. Dist. Ct., (1918) 140 Minn. 494. 168
N W. 589: Boright v. Chicago. etc., Ry.. (1930) 180 Minn. 52, 230 N. W.
457: Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314, 868;
Grubel v. Nassauer, (1913) 210 N. Y. 149, 103 N. E. 1113; Buckeye v.
Buckeye. (1931) 203 Wis. 248. 234 N. W. 342. Cf. Sirdar Singh v. Rajah
of Faridkote, [18941 A. C. 670. 10 T. L. R. 62: Perm. Bldg. Ass'n v. Hud-
son, (1896) 7 Queensland L. J. Rep. 23 (with acknowledgments to Pro-
fessor Beale).
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or does or has ever done any business here! But if Doe is not
in this state, it may be very material whether he lives here or not.8
Civil-law jurists approach these problems very differently. To
them our idea that jurisdiction depends on the court's ability to
catch and hold the defendant physically seems "putting the cart
before the horse."9  To determine whether his court may enter-
tain this litigation between these parties the Continental European
judge asks the very questions that we deem negligible and brushes
aside the facts that we hold crucial. A French court in such case
inquiries: Who are these parties,-Frenchmen or foreigners?
By the rules of what law should their rights be determined,-
French law or some foreign law? What is the nature of the case,
-where did the facts transpire, on which it rests? Finding the
dispute to be between Frenchmen over events that happened in
France, it will not deter the French court that the defendant now
is in Japan; it will "declare itself competent" to entertain the ac-
tion. It will try to give the defendant reasonable notice, affording
him practicable opportunity for defense; but that it must give
this notice to a defendant outside France will not strike the court
as an obstacle to or restriction of its jurisdiction. 0 In a nutshell,
-Darrah v. Watson, (1873) 36 Iowa 116; Fisher v. Fielding, (1895)
67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714. In this case the further plea, that defendant be-
ing only temporarily in England and about to depart thence, the plaintiff
sued him there with malice, expressly to hamper his defense and augment
its expense, was held demurrable. There are certain qualifications: Cf.
American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement, secs. 83. 45.
8Cf. McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343, 61
L. Ed. 608. The distinction between domicil and citizenship is here neg-
lected. The United States government claims personal jurisdiction over
its citizens domiciled abroad (Blackmer v. United States, (1932) 284 U. S.
421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252), and the trend internationally is to minimize the ma-
teriality of domicil as compared to citizenship. But citizenship of any one
of the United States depends on domicil (U.S. Const., amdt. XIV, sec. 1) :
hence among the several United States domicil and citizenship became vir-
tually synonymous. Whether one of the United States would be held
competent to exercise personal jurisdiction over an American citizen domi-
ciled abroad, Quaere: Cf. Goodrich, Conflicts 139-40; 1 Wharton. Con-
flicts, 3rd ed., secs. 7 & 8. Cf. American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws
Restatement, sec. 49. Cf. Post, notes 19 to 27.
9Pillet, Jurisdiction over Foreigners, (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 325, 335.
'
0 It will be understood that the present writer does not assume to
speak as an expert on civil law doctrine in any detail. Cf. Pillet. Jurisdic-
tion over Foreigners. (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 325. 335-37. "The Anglo-
American point of view, according to which a defendant may be sued on a
personal cause of action in any state in which service of process can be
made upon him, without reference to his domicil or to the place where
the cause of action arose or the preperty to which it may relate is situated.
is rejected by all other countries. . . ." "Service of process within the
state is not a jurisdictional requirement in countries of the civil law for
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our conception of jurisdiction seems based on the feeling that
"might makes right." Our questions concern the court's power:
\Vhat can we do to this defendant ;--specifically, can we now, if
need be, lay him by the heels? The civil law rules proceed from
considerations of ethics and convenience. Their questions run in
terms of "ought :" Ought this case to be adjudicated by a French
court? Is the issue such that a French court is peculiarly fitted
to try it, because the operative facts took place here and it is
French law that ought to be applied to them? Ought the (efen-
dant to be willing to submit this matter to French tribunals?
Formulated thus, the two doctrines seem fundamentally opposed.
But the foregoing statement of the common law is extreme. It is
not and never has been true that physical power is the foundation
of jurisdiction, and it becomes less and less true. Our plain trend
is toward the civil law position."
Jurisdiction may rest on consent as well as power.12  It is not
always recognized that jurisdiction by consent is an exception to
the maxim of "power :" by consenting, defendant is thought of as
having put himself in the power of the court. But that would be
literally true only where the consent was accompanied by de-.
fendant's physical entry into the state, within reach of its court
officers. But that is not at all necessary. Jurisdiction may be
founded on the consent of a defendant who never has been and
any cause of action. If jurisdiction exists the defendant may be cited to
appear and defend, although absent from the state:" Lorenzen, Cases on
Conflicts, 2nd ed., 126-127, n.
"'Between independent countries questions of jurisdiction are matter
of "comity" only (i.e., of the local, internal law of each country for itself) :
Hilton v. Guyot, (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139. 40 L. Ed. 95:
Fisher v. Fielding, (1895) 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714: Schibsby v. Westen-
holz, (1870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 155, 159-60, 40 L. J. Q. B. 73, but between tile
several United States jurisdiction is of constitutional obligation. If in the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court the Minnesota court, e.g., had
jurisdiction to entertain a given action its judgment therein must be en-
forced throughout the country under the "full faith and credit clause:"
(U.S. const., art. IV.. sec. 1) but if it did not have jurisdiction, then Iv
virtue of the "due process clause." (U.S. const., amdt. XIV.. see. 1) thejudgment cannot be enforced even in Minnesota: Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877)
95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; Roche v. McDonald. (1927) 275 U. S. 449. 48
Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L. Ed. 365; American Law Institute. Conflict of Laws Re-
statement, sec. 44. But for divorce purposes it seems a judgment may be
valid within the State. yet not entitled to "full faith and credit" in other
States: Haddock v. Haddock, (1906) 201 U. S. 562. 569-70, 572, 26 Sup.
Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867.
2 American Law Institute. Conflict of Laws Restatement, sees. 82(d).
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never will be in the state,--e.g., on his written cognovit, 3 or on
his appearance by attorney, he remaining abroad. In such cases
(and they are the typical ones) consent does not confer actual,
physical power. The court has no more such power over an ab-
sent defendant who has consented than it has over one who has
not consented. It is not because the court can do anything to
him that it has jurisdiction; it is because, having consented, he
ought to be bound. The jurisdiction rests on obligation, not com-
pulsion.
Jurisdiction is related to venue, and the earliest common law
seems to have held the geographic incidence of the operative
facts at least as material as the defendant's present whereabouts.
The royal courts at Westminster could entertain an action only if
the operative facts had occurred in Middlesexshire, and the whole
development of the "transitory" cause of action proceeded on a
highly characteristic common law fiction."' And the default judg-
ment is an innovation; it seems the common law courts originally
could give judgment only on defendant's actual appearance." In
Plantdgenet days, when the sheriff arrested the defendant and
held him till brought into court unless he gave "gages and safe
pledges"'16 for his appearance, such a rule corresponded to reality.
But under modern conditions the whole notion of the court's
physical power over the defendant becomes largely fictitious; at
least, highly conventionalized. Summons may be served on John
Doe in Minnesota today; tomorrow he may he in Chicago, and he
may never enter Minnesota again. Yet the MNinnesota court will
"3Hazel v. Jacobs, (1910) 78 N. J. L. 459, 75 AtI. 903; '.foe v. Shaffer,
(1921) 150 Minn. 114, 184 N. W. 785. Cf. (1918) 2 .NfINEsOrA l.A w R.-
VIEW 546.
14Per Mitchell, J., in Little v. Chicago, etc. Ry., (1896) 65 Minn. 48,
50, 67 N. W. 846. Cf. Scott, Fundamentals of Civil Procedure, ch. I. The
rule of criminal law is still, that the trial shall be held, not where de-
fendant is at the time of indictment, or lives at the time of indictment.
but where the alleged crime was committed. This is now a constitutionli
rule, (U.S. const., amdt. VI; Cf. Minn. const. art. I., sec. 6) but appar-
ently it represents the original common law doctrine for both civil and
criminal cases.
"1Cf. Hammersley, J., dissenting, in Fisher v. Fielding, (1895) 67
Conn. 91, 133, 34 Atl. 714. Again. in criminal cases still, the court will
proceed to trial only if defendant is personally present in its court-roo-m.
a rule enshrined in the constitutional privilege of "confrontation" (Cf.
ante, note 14). For this purpose the court can bring the absent criminal
defendant from abroad only by comity of the foreign government (extra-
dition) ; but that necessity does not inhibit his indictment while still
abroad, nor is his consent to return for trial essential.
31'Cf. Morgan, Introduction to the Study of Law 41.
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have unquestioned competence to enter a default judgment that
every other American state will be required to honor and enforce.
The jurisdiction obviously does not rest on any physical power
of the court to enforce its judgment; Doe may have no property
in Minnesota, that the court can reach.17 It does not rest on any
physical power ever actually exercised over Doe (other than the
trivial act of handing him the summons, which could be done as
well outside as inside the state). All that can be said is that the
Minnesota court could have seized Doe instead of merely handing
him the summons, and held him; and that merely potential act, not
performed, is conceived to found the jurisdiction.18 In effect the
Minnesota court says to all other courts: "We could, when this
action began, have arrested the defendant and held him till we
had determined his obligations and seen to it that he performed
them; therefore, you ought now to treat our determination as
final and conclusive." To the civilian the conclusion seems by no
means so obvious as it does to us.
Consent aside, it is not the law that a defendant who lives in
the state must also be here, to found personal jurisdiction." Most
states doubtless use a "substituted service," by which the summons
is left at defendant's home with a member of his household, and
its validity is unquestioned against a defendant even outside the
state or the country at the time.2" It has been thought that this is
the only constitutional mode of summoning an absent defendant
personally; so unless he has a visible household now actually here.
he is exempt from the state's personal jurisdiction. 2 ' But that
171t is uniformly held that jurisdiction acquired at the beginning of
litigation will persist to its end regardless of the court's continuing power
over the defendant: Mich. Tr. Co. v. Ferry, (1913) 228 U. S. 346, 33 Sup.
Ct. 550, 57 L. Ed. 867; Turner v. Even, (1924) 160 Minn. 238, 199 N. W.
751; American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement, sec. 81.
18The writ ne exeat is not entirely obsolete; Cf. Minn. G. S. 1923, sec.
156; 14 Encycl. P1. & Pr. 318; 45 C. J. 588.
19Cf. ante, note 8.
20Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9228. Cf. Lee v. MacFee, (1890) 45 Minn. 33,
47 N. W. 309. Cf. post, notes 23, 25, 27.
21Cf. Raher v. Raher, (1911) 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494. But
there is no force in the service of process on somebody other than the
defendant (member of defendant's household or anybody else) within the
State or outside it, unless the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction.
And if he is, service on him outside the State must be as good as service
on any proxy for him, within the State. In the case of State v. Belden,
(1927) 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916, the plaintiff was required by the
statute to mail summons and complaint to the defendant, abroad, and also
to file a copy with the local Secretary of State: but the Secretary was not
required to forward it to defendant or notify him. Urging that this
method of service was not "due process," Eschweiler, J., dissentiente, said:
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plainly confuses the fact of jurisdiction with the requirement of
due process in its exercise. If this court has the right to summon
this person as defendant at all, the mode by which it may actually
summon him into a particular litigation requires merely giving
him "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard," and that
does not depend on the ability to hand the summons to him or to
anyone for him, within the state. If he is not subject to the juris-
diction, no notice given him, however reasonable, actual and per-
sonal, will obligate him to respond. In an attachment action
against an absent non-resident, personal service on him outside the
state accomplishes no more than newspaper publication in the
state. The personal service abroad is much better notice; but
since he is not subject to the court's jurisdiction (though his prop-
erty is), no notice or service the court can make will subject him
to it.22  Suppose a (prospective) defendant in the state, so that
jurisdiction is assured. The statutes usually require that he be
summoned by handing the notice (summons) to him or to a mem-
ber of his household.2 3  But that is not by constitutional obliga-
tion. Service on his stenographer at his office instead of on his
maid at his house would indubitably do as well,-or service by
mail, or oral notification by telephone.2  So the important ques-
tion anent the state's domiciled citizen temporarily abroad is the
one of jurisdiction. If the state has not personal jurisdiction
"Without some such ceremony as service on the secretary of state" (to-
wit, in Wisconsin) "no one could possibly contend [italics, the author's]
that the other provisions of the statute authorizing the plaintiff to mail
summons and complaint to a defendant outside the state, could be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction." (at pp. 160, 921). Sed Quaere: In Blackmer v.
United States, (1932) 284 .U. S. 421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252, the subpoena as
served on the defendant in France. As to the supposed distinction be-
tween "substituted" and "constructive" service, cf. (1919) 3 MixEsorA
LAw REVIEw 277-78. Cf. post, notes 22 to 27, 44.22Against an absent non-resident, "process sent to him out of the
State and process published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings
to establish his personal liability:" Pennoyer v. Neff, (1877) 95 U. S.
714, 727, 24 L. Ed. 565.
23Cf. ante, note 20.24By statute all these methods are available in the conciliation courts
of Minnesota: Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 1379; and others might be. Cf. Froh-
lich v. Barber, (1927) 155 Tenn. 601, 296 S. W. 353; Schwarting v. Ogran.
(Neb. 1931) 242 N. W. 273. Our usual "personal service," by merely
handing defendant a copy of the summons (not technical "process" at all),
perhaps even without having the original at hand, represents a relaxation
of the early common law, which required that the original (bearing the
court's seal) be exhibited to defendant, if not also read to him: Cf. 19
Encyl. P1. & Pr. 613-14; Williams v. Van Valkenberg. (1857) 16 How.
(N.Y.) 144, 152; Hanna v. Russell, (1866) 12 Minn. (Gilf. 43) 80: First
Nat'l Bank of Whitewater v. Estensen, (1897) 68 Minn. 28, 70 N. W. 775.
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over him, handing the summons to his wife at his house (in the
state) could not confer it.25  If the state has personal jurisdic-
tion (as it seems clear it has) any mode of summoning "reason-
ably calculated to give him knowledge of the attempted exercise
of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard '28 will be consti-
tutionally available.2  But this jurisdiction cannot rest oil power.
The State has no more actual, present power over its absent citi-
zen than it has over the absent alien. 28  Like jurisdiction by con-
sent, domiciliary jurisdiction rests on obligation, not compulsion.
If jurisdiction can be founded on duty instead of power, why
should consent, or allegiance by birth, naturalization or residence
be its only bases? Why should not the defendant's voluntary par-
ticipation in the operative facts brought to pass within the state
entitle its courts to summon him from abroad to defend the liti-
25Cf. de la Montanya v. de la Montanya, (1896) 112 Cal. 101, 109-10,
44 Pac. 345: "Constructive service upon a party who is within the State
does not raise the question" (of jurisdiction). "The question there is
simply whether a defendant had such reasonable opportunity to be heard as
will constitute due process ..... Domicil has never, so far as I am aware.
been made the test of jurisdiction to render a personal judgment." (Sod
Quaere: Cf. ante, note 20 and post, note 27.) "Substituted service may be
valid upon those within the state when the same service would be void as
to those without the state. As to those within the state the question would
be whether it has afforded a defendant a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. But the process cannot go beyond the state and compel any person
in another state to resort to the state where the action is pending, there to
make his defense. No service will be recognized, made there, whether
actual or constructive." (i.e., for personal jurisdiction).
26American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement, sec. 80.
27The best notice reasonably practicable in the particular circumstances
may be held the only mode of summoning constitutionally available in those
circumstances: cf. American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement,
sec. 80, Comment (d) ; McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup.
Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608. Cf. Roller v. Holly. (1900) 176 U. S. 398. 20 Sun.
Ct. 410, 44 L. Ed. 520; Becker v. Becker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 218 S. W.
542; Bardwell v. Collins. (1890) 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315; McClymond
v. Noble, (1901) 84 Minn. 329, 87 N. W. 838: Roberts v. Roberts. (1917)
135 Minn. 397, 161 N. W. 148; Kempson v. Kemoson. (1902) 63 N. J. Eq.
783, 52 At. 360; May v. May, (1931) 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N. Y. S. 606;
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13. 48 Sup. Ct. 259. 72 L. Ed. 446:
Blackmer v. U.S., (1932) 284 'U. S. 421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252; (1932) 45Harv.
L. Rev. 1114; Goodrich, Conflicts 137-39; American Law Institute. Conflict
of Laws Restatement, sec. 84. Under its sec. 83, pp. 61, 62, the Restate-
ment refines on the distinction between domicil and residence, suggesting
that against a defendant actually residing in the state, but not domiciled here
and now abroad, the usual "substituted service" will found personal juris-
diction (Quaere as to other modes of "constructive" service), provided the
defendant does thereafter return to the state. No direct authority is cited
for this position.
2
8if defendant left a family in the state, they could (physically) be
seized as hostages.
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gation ensuing thereon? Before Pennoyer v. Neff"- and Fle.rner
v. Farson0 were decided, state statutes were not uncommon that
purported to authorize summoning personally an absent and non-
resident defendant who did business in the state, by serving his
agent who had done the business out of which the litigation grew.
After those decisions some state courts deemed such statutes un-
constitutional under those decisions."1 But it has been recognized
that they do not squarely foreclose the question, and some states
have refused so to hold. The Iowa supreme court has very re-
cently decided a case which, if carried to the United States Su-
preme Court, can hardly fail to help clear up the remaining ob-
scurities in the subject.3 2 Henry L. Doherty, of New York City,
maintained an office and agency at Des Moines for the sale of se-
curities. A dissatisfied purchaser brought personal action against
him in Iowa court, serving the agent in charge of Doherty's Des
Moines office.3 3 An Iowa statute purports to authorize this pro-
cedure, and the Iowa court declares it constitutional. 4
It is now thoroughly settled that a corporation is subject to the
personal jurisdiction of every state in which it does business.
29(1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565.
30(1918) 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L Ed. 250.
31Cf. Guenther v. Am. Steel Co., (1903) 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419;
Andrews v. McClanahan, (1927) 220 Ky. 504, 295 S. W. 457; Green v.
Snyder, (1905) 114 Tenn. 100, 84 S. W. 808; Knox v. Wagner, (1919) 141
Tenn. 348, 209 S. W. 638.
32Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., (Iowa 1932) 241 N. W. 700.
33Later, the Iowa secretary of state was also served, under the local
"blue-sky law;" but the decision is based wholly on the earlier service on
Doherty's actual employe, which the "blue-sky law" did not provide for.
34Iowa, Code 1927, sec. 11079: "When a corporation, company or indi-
vidual [italics, the author's] has, for the transaction of any business, an
office or agency in any county other than that in which the principal re-
sides, service may be made on any agent or clerk employed in such office
or agency, in all actions growing out of or connected with the business of
that office or agency." The opinion says that this statute in Iowa goes
back to 1851. Cf. ante, note 31. Cf. Joel v. Bennett, (1916) 276 Ill. 537.
115 N. E. 5; Aikman v. Sanderson, (1908) 122 La. 265, 47 So. 600; Rauber
v. Whitney, (1890) 125 Ind. 216, 25 N. E. 186; Cabanne v. Graf, (1902) 87
Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461 ; Moredock v. Kirby, (C.C. Ky. 1902) 118 Fed. 180:
State v. Adams Express Co., (1896) 66 Minn. 271, 68 N. W. 1085. Cases are
collected in Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 145, note 97. Cf. Scott. Business
Jurisdiction over Non-Residents, (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871: Scott,
Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 583:
Hinton, Substituted Service on Non-residents, (1925) 20 Il1. L. Rev. 1. The
discussion has not seemed to appreciate that this situation presents the focal
point of collision between the (supposedly traditional) common-law and the
civil law theories of jurisdiction, and that the tendency to broaden the basis
of jurisdiction to cover it indicates an unmistakable movement toward the
general civil-law attitude.
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At first, basis for this jurisdiction was found in an "implied con-
sent." Since the state, it was said, could if it chose exclude for-
eign corporations from doing business in the state, it could im-
pose any reasonable terms for its admission of them, and exacting
a consent to the state's personal jurisdiction was not unreason-
able. Then, the consent could be "implied" from the bare fact of
the corporation's doing business in the state.35  But when the
jurisdiction was upheld against a corporation that trai~sacted only
inter-state commerce in the state (which the state could not pro-
hibit), the "consent" theory broke down.31 Then the jurisdic-
tion was rested on a theory of corporate "presence." The cor-
poration is said to be "present" wherever it acts.3  But in what
3 5Lafayette Co. v. French, (1855) 59 U. S. 404, 15 L. Ed. 451.
36 Int. Harv. Co. v. Kentucky, (1914) 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944,
58 L. Ed. 1479. Sed. Cf. People's Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., (1917)
246 U. S. 79, 86-88, 38 Sup. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587. The state is not al-
lowed to exercise this jurisdiction so as "unduly" to burden inter-state
commerce: Cf. Davis v. Farm. Coop. Co., (1923) 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct.
556, 67 L. Ed. 996; Denver & R. G. Ry. v. Terte, (1932) 284 U. S. 284, 52
Sup. Ct. 152; Ewing v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1927) 171 Minn. 87, 214
N. W. 12; Boright v. Chicago & Rock I. Ry., (1930) 180 Minn. 52, 230
N. W. 457; Mich. Cent. Ry. v. Mix, (1929) 278 U. S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct. 207,
73 L. Ed. 470; Atchison & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, (1924) 265 U. S. 101,
44 Sup. Ct. 469, 68 L. Ed. 928; Ex rel. St. Louis Ry. v. Taylor, (1924) 266
U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47, 69 L. Ed. 247; (1929) 13 MINNESOrA LAW RE-
viEw 485.37 1.e., sustainedly and habitually conducts a substantial part of its
business. Mere isolated or sporadic acts will not found jurisdiction. Cf.
Brush Creek Co. v. Morgan Co., (C.C. Mo. 1905) 136 Fed. 505 (this case
must be deemed overruled) ; James Dickinson Co. v. Harry, (1927) 273
U. S. 119, 122, 47 Sup. Ct. 308, 71 L. Ed. 569; Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis Co.,
(1923) 260 U. S. 516, 43 Sup. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372. Cf. Atkinson v.
U. S. Operating Co., (1915) 129 Minn. 232, 152 N. W. 410; Dow v. First
Nat. Bank of Malta, (1922) 153 Minn. 19, 189 N. W. 653; U. S. Rubber
Co. v. Gregory, (1931) 205 Wis. 189, 236 N. W. 524; Hutchinson v. Chase
& Gilbert, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 139. The British courts
apparently enforce much the same distinction: Cf. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre
Co. v. Achtien-gesellschaft, etc., [1902] 1 K. B. 342, 71 L. J. K. B. 284;
Aktiesselskabet, etc., v. Grand Trunk Ry., [1912] 1 K. B. 222, 81 L. J. K.
B. D. 189. Manifestly it rests on considerations, not of power, but of fair-
ness and convenience; Cf. L. Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 139, that the "controlling consideration"
is an "estimate of the inconveniences that would result from requiring it
to defend where it has been sued." Otherwise, "we can see no qualitative
distinction between one part of its doings and another. . . . If we are to
attribute locality to it" (the corporation) "at all it must be equally present
wherever any part of its work goes on." (at p. 141.) So the important
distinction between jurisdiction to litigate any and all (transitory) causes,
or only those arising out of business done in the state rests on considera-
tions of obligation and convenience (or consent), rather than power: Cf.
Penn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344,
61 L. Ed. 610; Dragon Co. v. Storrow, (1925) 165 Minn. 95, 205 N. W.
694. The whole doctrine of jurisdiction over corporations is shot through
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sense is it true that a corporation is present wherever it acts, in
which it is not equally true that an individual is present wherever
he acts ?' It is replied that the individual has a physical presence
where his body is located in space, while the corporation has no
such actual, physical presence anywhere. Its "presence" at all is
a figure of speech.3 9 That may be conceded. Yet the individual
has that same figurative presence wherever he acts that a corpora-
tion has. It has been acutely pointed out that if I in Minnesota
do business with "Doherty and Co." of New York, the business
is the same, the manner of Doherty and Co.'s participation in it is
the same, my relation to it and all its incidents and effects are
the same, whether "Doherty and Co." be the trade name of Mr.
Doherty alone or the name of an unincorporated association or of
a limited liability company."0 Supposing I did the business with
Doherty agents, it is all the same (in a business way) whether
Doherty, or the members of the firm or company, do really live
in New York or in Minnesota. It may well be that I have no
knowledge of the truth as to any of these matters. If the figura-
tive "presence" is a moral presence sufficient to found jurisdiction
in case "Doherty and Co." turns out to be a corporation, why
should it not equally suffice when "Doherty and Co." is merely
the name used by Mr. Doherty for his business transactions? If
it be said, because the plaintiff can go to New York and there
serve Mr. Doherty personally, and hence he should be required to
do that if he finds his proper defendant is just Mr. Doherty, it
remains true that plaintiff can always go to the State of the cor-
poration's charter and there sue it, just as he can go to Mr. Do-
herty's personal residence to sue him. Even there, he must serve
with civil-law prepossessions. Cf. St. Clair v. Cox, (1882) 106 U. S. 350,
1 Sup. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (the opinion elaborates both the "consent"
and the "presence" theories) ; L. & N. Ry. v. Chatters, (1929) 279 ,U. S.
320, 49 Sup. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy, (1925)
267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250, 69 L Ed. 634; Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker,(1905) 196 U. S. 432, 444-46, 25 Sup. Ct. 375, 49 L. Ed. 540: Patterson '.
Shattuck-Arizona Co., (1926) 169 Minn. 49, 210 N. W. 620; Ruff v. Man-
hattan Oil Co., (1927) 172 Minn. 585, 216 N. W. 331; Grant v. Cananea
Co., (1907) 189 N. Y. 241, 82 N. E. 191; Ifingus v. Florence Mining Co.,(1931) 302 Pa. St. 529, 153 At. 723.38Whatever be the final theory in physics, the principle of "action at a
distance" is well recognized in the law, e.g., by correspondence, by throw-
ing a projectile, by acting through an agent.39Cf. Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists, (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 563, 574-78; L Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 139, 141.40Henderson, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, (1917) 30 Harv.
L. Rev. 676, 684-86.
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the corporation's agents. But going to New York to sue Mr.
Doherty, the plaintiff may actually hand the summons to Mr.
Doherty's wife or valet, not to Mr. Doherty himself.
The problem of jurisdiction over partnerships puts further
stress and strain on the belief that the corporation's juridical but
intangible personality makes the basis of jurisdiction over it pe-
culiar. Many states doubtless have statutes similar to Minne-
sota's section 9180. 41  Given a firm composed of members A, B
and C. A in Minnesota is served with summons in a Minnesota
action. B and C live and are elsewhere. It seems settled that on
this service the Minnesota court may have jurisdiction to enter a
default judgment which will be binding to some extent and in
some sort on B and C,-to-wit: on their "interests in the firm and
its property," and which under the "full faith and credit" clause
can be made binding on their interests in property of the firm that
is outside Minnesota and has never been in it.' But the theory
and precise limits of this jurisdiction are unsettled. Suppose A
does not live in Minnesota either, but is merely found and served
here, e.g., vacationing in our north woods, or, suppose A does
live here, but the firm is not in business here. Are these facts
material to the jurisdiction? Our statute does not say so. 3  In-
escapably, the jurisdiction must rest on some formula that allows
service of an agent to bind his non-resident principal. If its scope
is to be limited to firms doing business in the state, we have a
precise analogue to the jurisdiction over corporations. By having
done business here through their firm, B and C are given a moral
41Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9180: "When two or more persons transact
business as associates under a common name, whether such name comprises
the names of such persons or not, they may be sued by such common name
and the summons may be served on one or more of them. The judgment
in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates. the same as
though all had been named as defendants." Cf. the Iowa statute (juoted
ante, note 34.
42 (Semble) Sngg v. Thornton, (1889) 132 U. S. 524. 10 Sup. Ct. 163,
33 L. Ed. 447; Cf. East Denver v. Doherty, (D.C. N.Y. 1923) 293 Fed.
804; State v. Adams Express Co., (1896) 66 Minn. 271, 68 N. W. 1085:
Taylor v. Order of Ry. Conductors, (1903) 89 Minn. 226, 94 N. V. 684.
Cf. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, (1850) 11 How. (U.S.) 165, 13 L. Ed. 648;
Beaver Board Co. v. Imbrie & Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 271;
Esteve Bros. v. Harrell. (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 382.
43In Taylor v. Order of Ry. Conductors, (1903) 89 Minn. 226, 94 N. W.
684, service was made on a member of the Order who happened to be in
Minnesota. He was not here representing or doing any business for the
Order, and non constat that the cause of action arose out of any business
(lone here. Cf. Magruder & Foster, Jurisdiction over Partnerships. (1924)
37 Harv. L. Rev. 793; Holdoegel, Jurisdiction over Partnerships, (1926)
11 Iowa L. Rev. 193.
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presence here exactly like the moral presence of a corporation
wherever it does business. But if B and C as partners can be
given such a moral presence here by having done business here
(perchance only through agents and employees), why cannot B
alone be given the same moral presence here if he has done busi-
ness here through his individual agents?
The urge to apply some such theory of jurisdiction to individ-
ual defendants became irresistible after the advent of the auto-
mobile, and it is now settled that the non-resident motorist who is
involved in an accident in the state, but who has left the state be-
fore litigation was begun, can nevertheless be summoned personally
into the courts of the state where the accident occurred, though
original process cannot be served in that state on him or on any-
body actually living with or working for him.4' But again, the
theoretical foundation and exact limits of this jurisdiction are in
doubt. Can the foreign owner who, without coming into the state
himself, sends his car here in charge of an employee or a member
of his family be so summoned before our courts to litigate the
accident ensuing here?"G Taken most broadly, the auto decisions
can lend support to the contention that any individual who does
business in the state, of whatever sort, can be summoned person-
ally before the courts of that state to litigate that business. More
conservatively, those decisions can be rested on the automobile's
dangerous and fugitive character and the state's wide police power
over its highways, amounting to virtual proprietorship. So con-
strued they hardly prove that a Chicago merchant who owns a
clothing store in St. Paul, which he operates through hired employ-
ees, can be summoned personally to litigate in Minnesota court
44And if B can thus be held subject to the jurisdiction, the fact that
he is not here and does not live here will not, it is submitted, be an obstacle
to its valid exercise. Any mode of "reasonable notice" will answer the
purpose. In Esteve Bros. v. Harrell, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 382.
an employe of the firm was served, not a partner. Sed Cf. Flexner v.
Farson, (1918) 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 250. Cf. ante.
notes 21, 24, 25. 27. 34.
45Hess v. Pawloski, (1927) 274 U. S. 352. 47 Sup. Ct. 632. 71 L. rd.
1091. Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259. 72
L. Ed. 446: Schilling v. Odelbak. (1929) 177 .Minn. 90, 224 N. W. 696;
State v. Belden, (1927) 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. Wr. 916.
46Cf. Gesell v. Wells, (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 331. 236 N. Y. S. 381.
(aff'd in 254 N. Y. 604, 173 N. E. 885, without opinion and on an appeal
apparently raising only other points) ; O'Tier v. Sell, (1929) 226 Api.
Div. 434, 235 N. Y. S. 534, reversed in 252 N. Y. 403. 169 N. E. 624, hut
on other grounds: Cleaas v. Hurley Co., (R.I. 1931) 157 At. 426. Cf.
(1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 771; (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 909: Scott,
Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563.
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business done at the St. Paul store. He has a constitutional right to
do business, absente, in Minnesota. But so has the Illinois motor-
ist a right to use Minnesota highways on terms not unreasonably
discriminating between him and Minnesota residents. The limits
of the police power are exceedingly vague. While the state may
not prohibit, it may regulate ("reasonably") any and every line
of business. Why is it not a reasonable regulation to subject the
owner of the business to the state's personal jurisdiction for liti-
gation growing out of the business? The business of selling se-
curities, regulated by the "blue-sky laws" and involved in David-
son v. Doherty47 is not a business "affected with a public interest,"
whatever that justly famous phrase may be taken to mean. It is
regulated merely incidentally to the general police power. If its
regulation can include subjecting the absent and non-resident ven-
dor to the personal jurisdiction of any state where his agents
negotiate his sales, the same can be done with any and every line
of business.4
Whether the United States Supreme Court will take this broad
position cannot be predicted with certainty. The trend of the de-
cisions and the pressure of modern business both run strongly
in that direction. Taking it would adopt in large measure the
civil law conception of jurisdiction, yet would not depart so
widely from authentic common law tradition as might be sup-
4
-(Iowa 1931) 241 N. W. 700.48The opinion mentions the state's regulatory power expressed in its
"blue-sky law" as a basis for the jurisdiction; though, as noted ante, (note
33) the service made on the secretary of state specifically pursuant to that
law is ignored and the jurisdiction is rested flatly on the service made on
Doherty's own employee under a wholly different statute long antedating
the "blue-sky law." American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws Restate-
ment, sec. 89, holds that any act done in the state may subject the actor
to that state's jurisdiction to litigate causes of action growing out of that
act (semble, N.B., not necessarily a continuous course of business, as for
corporations; Cf. ante, note 37). But at see. 90 the qualification is made
that one of the United States cannot constitutionally use this principle except
for acts which it can "make the doing of" .. . . "within the state illegal
unless the person doing the acts . ..has consented to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of such acts."
That is a cautious statement of the law of last evening. But the diffi-
culty is to specify any acts that the state cannot "make the doing of
illegal" except under regulations that will include subjection to the juris-
diction. Sanitary regulations, e.g., can be imposed on the clothing store,
or the grocery store, and then to assure their observance by the non-resi-
dent owner why cannot he be subjected to the jurisdiction? It is submitted
no stopping place will be discoverable. It will be noted that the partner-
ship statutes (e.g., Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9180; cf. ante, notes 41 and 34)
and the decisions under them (cf. ante, note 42) are not limited to any
peculiar sorts of business. Cf. ante, note 44.
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posed. Opinions enunciating emphatically the doctrine of "phys-
ical power" have been likely to contain "weasel words," used ap-
parently ex industria, to leave a loophole for basing jurisdiction
on more ethical grounds.4 9  It may be said that the notion that
power (meaning, the ability to serve original process on the de-
fendant within the state) should be the primary and fundamental
basis of jurisdiction is of rather late growth in the common law;
the extreme doctrine of such cases as Fisher v. Fielding," that a
defendant found however temporarily at a place however remote
from his home, his business or the scene of the operative facts
must submit to litigation there and shall have no plea of forum
non conveniens or improper motives on plaintiff's part, is later
still.51 Such a doctrine is out of line, not only with the law of
49"Neither do we mean to assert that a state may not require a non-
resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or
making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent . . . in the state
to receive service of process . . . in legal proceedings instituted with re-
spect to such partnership, association or contracts, or to designate a place
where such service may be made . . ., and provide, upon their failure to
make such appointment or to designate such place, that service may be
made upon a public officer . . ., or in some other prescribed way, and that
judgments rendered upon such service may not be binding upon the non-
residents both within and without the state." Pennoyer v. Neff. (1877) 95
U. S. 714, 735, 24 L. Ed. 565. [Italics the author's.] This language is
quoted and relied on in Davidscdn v. Doherty, (Iowa 1931) 241 N. W. 700,
703. The same theory is applied to torts by the automobile decisions (ante,
note 45). Cf. Douglas v. Forrest, (1828) 4 Bing. 686, 703, "The debts
were contracted in the country in which the judgments were given, whilst
the debtor resided in it." Cf. Schibsby v. Westenholz, (1870) L R. 6
Q. B. 155, 161, 40 L. J. Q. B. 73. "If at the time when the obligation was
contracted the defendants were within the foreign country, but left it
before the suit was instituted, we should be inclined to think the laws of
that country bound them; though before finally deciding this we should
like to hear the question argued." The doctrine of "power" is constantly
referred back to the case of Buchanan v. Rucker, (1808) 9 East 192: in
which it did not appear that the defendant had ever been within the terri-
tory of the foreign court that had rendered the iudgment sued on. nor
that any of the operative facts had occurred there, and in which Lord Ellen-
borough exclaimed, "Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the
rights of the whole world?"--a judicial emanation, it may be suggested,
that shed more heat than light.
50(1895) 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714.
511t may be noted, however, that the defendant in that case did not
tender those pleas to the British court. That court's jurisdiction need not
be denied; but a judgment from a foreign country can constitutionally be
reviewed here on the merits, apart from questions of jurisdiction or fraud:
H1ilton v. Cuyot, (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95.
The unfortunate enouncement in that opinion of an illiberal doctrine of re-
taliation has obscured the real merit of the decision. It rests at bottom en
the ancient common law rule that in an action on a domestic judgment the
general issue pleads nul tiel record, but to an action on a foreign judgment
the plea is nil debet: 34 C. J. 1098, 1117, 1118. -Undoubtedly in this re-
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the Roman world, but with the best administration of justice under
modern conditions.52 A practical difficulty in this country is the
inelasticity of our judicial system and our scant legislative author-
ity over it. The present writer has noted before, in another con-
nection, that the Australians patterned their new national con-
stitution fundamentally upon our own; as with us, their national
(Commonwealth) government has only enumerated, delegated
powers, and the states retain the general, reserved powers.63 But
the Australians (doubtless on careful survey of the American
scene) unified their judicial system. They not only made their
national supreme court ("the high court") a court of general ap-
peal from the state courts in all fields and not simply for "federal
questions ;" they also empowered their Commonwealth Parliament
to confer federal jurisdiction on the state courts, thus minimizing
the need to create separate inferior federal- courts. Still more,
Parliament is empowered to provide for and regulate the running
and service of process from the state courts throughout the coun-
try. 4 That cuts at one stroke through all the difficulties that are the
subject of this paper. It need not be feared that the Australian
Parliament is likely to authorize Queensland process to bind a
defendant in Tasmania without some good reason for requiring
the Tasmanian to respond to a Queensland court,-in the inci-
dence of the operative facts, the convenience of witnesses and of
trial, the location of the property in controversy, or something
else." But all these problems become matter of national legisla-
spect the "full faith and credit clause" makes our state judgments do-
mestic judgments throughout this country. But it would seem that a
broader theory of jurisdiction might have been developed.
521f it were really a sound theory, it would be difficult to justify the
refusal to enforce foreign criminal and penal judgments. Cf. Huntington
v. Attrill. (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123: Wiscon-
sin v. Pelican Ins. Co., (1888) 127 U. S. 265, 8 Supr. Ct. 1370, 32 L. Ed.
239. Sed Cf. Goodrich, Conflicts 470-72.53Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional
Law, (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REviaW 161, 166.
54Commonwealth of Australia Const. Act (1900) ch. I, sec. 51 (xxiv.,
xxv.) ; ch. III., secs. 71, 73 (ii.), 77 (iii.).
55Nothing prevents the Australian Parliament from adopting (and
adapting) our rules, e.g., against unduly burdening inter-state commerce
(Cf. ante, note 36), forbidding jurisdiction over non-residents founded on
isolated acts and requiring a settled, substantial course of business (Cf.
ante, notes 37, 48), and limiting the right to serve process exterritorially
to causes of action growing out of business done in the state (Cf. ante.
note 37). But in Australia these and any other rules can be adopted.
amended and abandoned legislatively. In this country Congress for most
purposes has not even seen fit to give the federal district courts a national
jurisdiction, though its right to do so "is not open to question:" Eastman
THE SHIFTNG BASIS OF JURISDICTION
tive policy, alterable and to be moulded at changing need and on
broad considerations of justice and policy, unhampered by archaic
doctrines of "power," the principle stare decisis or any artificial
logic-chopping of lawyers. Who that has struggled with the in-
tricate technicalities of federal and state jurisdiction in America
will not sigh for the free and simple flexibility of the Australian
constitution ?56
Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Cc., (1927) 273 U. S. 359. 374, 47 Sup. Ct. 400. 404,
71 L. Ed. 684, 689. Cf. The Judicial Code, sec. 51.
SGWe hear an echo of the civil law in the doctrine that the only court
competent to decree nullity of a marriage is a court of the state by whose
law the validity of the marriage at its inception is to be determined: The
American Law Institute Conflict of Laws Restatement, sec. 121. Sed Cf.
(1932) 16 MlINNESOTA LAw RviEw 398; Goodrich, Conflicts pp. 301-04.
In general it is an undoubted advantage to have litigation tried in a court
whose domestic law is the proper law applicable to the operative facts.
That court knows (should know) its own law better than any foreign
court can. Cf. Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1930) 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. V.
314, 868. But obviously, to make the court's jurisdiction depend on such
incidence of the operative facts is to go over bag and baggage to the
civilians. Apart from that, it is hardly practicable to make the relevance
of one or another system of law to the operative facts the test of jurisdic-
tion to litigate them. With respect to marriage, the Restatement's doctrine
can hold only of a direct proceeding attacking the validity of the marriage.
Any court anywhere (otherwise competent) will unhesitatingly consider
and determine collaterally, the validity of any marriage, wherever and be-
tween whomsoever celebrated; Cf. Hall v. Industrial Commission. (1917)
165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312; Royal v. Cudahy Pck. Co.. (1922) 195
Iowa 759, 190 N. V. 427; Ex. rel. Devine v. Rodgers, (D.C. Pa. 1901)
109 Fed. 886.
